My research explores the epistemic and normative implications of social and cognitive psychology for philosophical theories of rationality. Utilizing empirical research concerning how we process information, I examine our ability to gather and evaluate evidence in accordance with epistemic norms. My current projects focus on three distinct but interconnected topics:
 
(1)  philosophical conceptions of rationality, reasoning, and epistemic defeat,
(2)  implicit attitudes, especially those with biasing effects, and
(3)  etiological debunking arguments (and specifically, those which would undermine moral and political beliefs)
 
Together, these projects ground an empirically informed, theoretical account of the nonevidentiary factors affecting our doxastic practices and the significance of these factors for philosophical conceptions of the rational epistemic agent. 
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In my dissertation, I explore how higher-order evidence (HiOE) regarding the operation of our rational capacities (e.g., evidence of our susceptibility to cognitive bias) should affect what it is rational to believe at a first-order level. Using recent work on the nature of inference and the epistemic basing relation and cognitive psychological literature on how humans reason, I generate a novel account of the irrationality involved in failing to update one’s first-order beliefs in light of relevant HiOE by arguing that reasoning and basing are cognitive acts over which we exert (indirect) control. Drawing an analogy to practical akrasia, I argue that failing to respond appropriately to relevant HiOE would be to act cognitively in a manner that one cannot endorse

published articles

“Words on Psycholinguistics,” The Journal of Philosophy. 113.12 (2016): 593-616 
“Testimonial Injustice and Prescriptive Credibility Deficits,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 46.6 (2016): 924-947 
“Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props,” Res Philosophica. 96.2  (2019): 175-198

book chapters

“Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement,” with Kirk Ludwig, In Inference and Consciousness, edited by Timothy Chan and Anders Nes. Routledge. (forthcoming)